Hivatkozási szám

MSZ IEC 60231:2011

Dokumentumazonosító

150962

Cím

Atomreaktorok műszerezettségi alapelvei

Angol cím

General principles of nuclear reactor instrumentation

Alkalmazási terület

1.2 Scope 1.2.1 This Recommendation gives guidance on the provision of reactor instrumentation and recommends standards of good practice. 1.2.2 The main body of the Recommendation is of general application and aspects applicable only to particular types of reactors are included in Appendices *. 1.2.3 Items of instrumentation are included only where they have a direct bearing on the over-all safety and effective control of the reactor. 1.3 General requirements 1.3.1 The responsibility for safe operation of a reactor should be vested in the management chain of command. Nevertheless, the design should facilitate safe operation under all credible conditions throughout the life of the reactor. 1.3.2 The instrumentation should be such as to enable the operator to make an adequate assessment of the physical state and behaviour of the plant. Suitable warnings should be provided for indicating abnormal conditions. 1.3.3 The degree of protection demanded from instrumentation should be determined from the following considerations: a) The situation where correct action of the safety system is required to avoid unacceptable hazard tot he general public in case of accident. In this case, the safety system design should take into account the consequence of failure, and the degree of protection provided is determined by humanitarian, practical, economic and other considerations. b) The situation where unnaceptable hazards to the general public cannot arise even though the safety system fails completely. In this case, the function of the safety system is to protect the plant against faults which would otherwise damage it, and to minimize the radiation exposure of persons employed in the process. 1.3.4 Bearing in mind the diverse nature of possible incidents, the complex behaviour of the core as it becomes more irradiated, and the possible unknown errors in the mathematical model used to estimate the effect of the incident, there may be doubt as to whether detection by a single parameter can provide adequate protection. Whenever this is so, the incident should be sensed by at least two independent parameters, one of which should, wherever possible, be a direct measurement of the parameter of greatest concern. 1.3.5 The reactor control system and the reactor safety system should be as nearly independent as possible, in the sense that a fault in one should not lead to incorrect action of the other. In general, safety action should have priority over control action. a) The design of the reactor safety system should be such that no credible action or failure or malfunctioning of the reactor control system can lead to a situation in which protection is not provided by the reactor safety system. In considering failure of the control system, all credible combinations of failure should also be considered. b) The design of the control system should be such that no credible failure of the safety system can result in the increase of reactivity by the control system. In considering failure of the safety system, all credible combinations of failure should also be considered. 1.3.6 Where reactors have to be operated in conditions other than normal (for instance, commissioning), adequate safety and control arrangements shall still be preserved.

ICS

27.120.20 Atomerőművek. Biztonság

Műszaki Bizottság

A szabvány nyelve

angol

Az érvényesség kezdete

2011-01-01

Forrás

idt IEC 60231:1967

Előd

Utód

Módosítás

Kiegészítő információk

SZK-közlemények

Kapcsolódó európai jogszabály

A szabvány

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